Non-Rational Cognition and Action in Plato’s Psychology: A Critique of Lorenz

I

     Hendrik Lorenz, in his book The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, wishes to defend a certain interpretation of Plato’s psychological theory. Lorenz claims, (1) “The theory takes it that impulses to act arise, not from the soul as a whole, but, in each case, specifically from some part of it.” (Lorenz, 2006) And (2) that “…it is part of Plato’s theory that appetite is non-rational in the strong sense of lacking the capacity for reasoning. At the same time, the theory take appetite, like other parts of the soul, to be capable of giving rise to fully formed impulses to act, so that it can, all by itself, get a person to behave in some specific way or other.” (Lorenz, 2006) In the pursuit of defending these claims Lorenz will have to show that each “part” of Plato’s soul is able to motivate an individual to act. Further, he will have to explain what it means for the appetitive part of the soul to be “non-rational” and finally, how even though appetite is “non-rational” it is capable of more than just motivating an agent, but all by itself capable of causing an agent to act.
     If Lorenz’s interpretation of Plato’s appetitive part of the soul, that it is capable of moving an agent all by itself, can be adequately defended then we have good reason to accept his interpretation as opposed to others. However I will argue we do not have good reason to accept his interpretation. Section II will outline Lorenz’s reasoning to support the claim that impulses to act arise specifically from some part of the soul. Section III will respond to one objection against Lorenz’s interpretation. Section IV will explicate what resources the appetitive part of the soul has available to it in order to move agents, and will also defend the viewpoint that appetite is not capable of “means-end reasoning”. Finally, in Section V I will argue against Lorenz’s interpretation, claiming that while he may have convincing points, he does not successfully establish his interpretation of appetite, specifically that it can “…all by itself, get a person to behave in some specific way or other.” (Lorenz, 2006) It is important to note the following distinction in what I am claiming to show. I am not claiming that appetite cannot influence the agents actions in some way or another, but I am claiming that Lorenz does not successfully establish the claim that appetite can get an agent to act in some way or another all by itself.

II

     Why does Plato’s soul have parts to begin with? In Plato’s Republic, Socrates, and later Adeimantus and Glaucon, are concerned with the question what is justice? What do we mean when we say that the virtuous person is just? In pursuit of what this disposition inside the virtuous person might be like, Socrates thinks it would be helpful to project this disposition upon a larger canvas, the city.  And in their pursuit of the just city, and ultimately of justice itself, they divide the “classes” of the city into the following three: the working-class (the weavers, farmers, builders), the auxiliaries (military defense), and the philosophers. Therefore, as the just city is composed of, roughly speaking, three classes of people each concerned with different matters, and the city is intended to be a projection of the human soul on a larger canvas, we would expect the human soul to be structured in a similar manner. And indeed it is.
     The Platonic soul is partitioned into three parts:  appetite, spirit, and reason, and just like the city each part concerned with different matters. For example, appetite is concerned with food, drink, sex, and apparently money  (this represents the working-class). In like manner, spirit (the auxiliaries) is concerned with acquiring and maintaining honor, and reason (the philosopher(s)) with acquiring wisdom. Since the soul is the seat of all motivation in the human being and each part of the soul is concerned with different matters, it would be helpful to understand how, for Plato, each of these souls parts interacts with the others. Do all impulses to action arise through a “united” soul? Or is it the case that each part is capable of motivating the agent to act in some way or another?
     Plato seems to consider both viewpoints when Socrates raises the following questions:

Do we do each of these things with the same part of ourselves, or do we do them with three different parts? Do we learn with one part, get angry with another, and with some third part desire the pleasures of food, drink, sex, and the others that are closely akin to them? Or, when we set out after something, do we act with the whole of our soul, in each case? (Republic, 436A)

And shortly after Socrates gives us an answer as to whether or not we are motivated to act with the “whole” of our soul, or with some part of it, when he says:

It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, and at the same time. So, if we ever find this happening in the soul, we’ll know we aren’t dealing with one thing but many. (Republic, 436B-C)

I believe it is sufficient to claim that from this passage not only does Plato believe the soul is capable of, in some way or another, motivating an agent to act, but also that there is a conflict in motivation at times, and that this motivational conflict cannot arise from a singular part itself, but from many [read: at least two] parts. How does Plato use this conflict in motivation to argue for partition?
     The partition of the soul is argued for using the commonly called ‘principle of opposites’ (PO). PO states the following: “It is clear that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time.” (Lorenz, 2006) That is to say, one soul part cannot at the same time both bid and forbid an agent to act in some way, at the same time, with relation to the same thing. An illustrative example may prove helpful. Consider the tale of Leontius who on his way up from the Piraeus saw corpses lying at the feet of the executioner. At the same time he both, it is said, had ‘an appetite’ to look at them and at the same time was ‘disgusted’. Finally, the struggle subsided and he screamed, “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight.”  It would be odd to say that it is Leontius’ soul as a whole that both bids and forbids him to look at the corpses, just as it would be odd for someone to tell you to at the same time both write and not write a letter to your Grandmother. Yet we do experience these conflicts in our desires. Thus Leontius’ simultaneous desire to look at the corpses, and his aversion to not look at them Plato thinks reveals a partition in the soul, two parts acting against each other at the same time. Now let us consider a more illuminating example.
     To begin, Socrates makes reference to a common phenomena we seem to experience:

“Hence the soul of the thirsty person, insofar as he’s thirsty, doesn’t wish anything else but to drink, and it wants this and is impelled towards it.” (Republic, 439A 7-B 1)

I take this to not be uncommon. Say you have been out running for exercise, when you finish you experience thirst and therefore desire to drink and are also motivated to do so. Shortly after Socrates says the following:

“Therefore, if something draws it back when it is thirsting, wouldn’t that thing be something different in it from whatever thirsts and drives it like a beast to drink? It can’t be, we say, that the same thing, with the same part of itself, in relation to the same, at the same time, does opposite things.” (Republic, 439B 3-6)

And later:

“What, then, should once say about them? Isn’t it that there is something in their soul, bidding them to drink, and something different, forbidding them to do so, that overrules the thing that bids?”
“I think so.” (Republic, 439C 4-8)

And this too seems plausible as well. As said before, it doesn’t make sense for my soul as a whole to bid me to drink and forbid me to drink at the same time, and Socrates seems to agree. In light of this and using PO, Lorenz constructs Plato’s argument for tri-partition on pp. 25:

     (1) The same thing cannot be characterized by opposites in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, and at the same time.
     (2) Desiring and being averse are opposites; desiring to φ, and being averse to φ-ing, are opposites in relation to the same thing.
     (3) It happens that the soul desire to φ, and at the same time is averse to φ-ing.
     (4) The soul has at least two parts.

As we have seen above it is not only clear for Plato, but also to us, that at times we seem to desire to do something and at the same time are averse to doing that very same thing.
     So because this phenomenon exists and Plato believes that the soul as a whole cannot bid and forbid me to act in some way at the same time, e.g. to desire to drink and be averse to drinking, I believe along with Lorenz not only reveals a partition, but also supports the view that each soul-part can motivate the agent to act in some way or another.
     Thus these passages allow for Lorenz to assert with confidence the interpretation that each part of Plato’s soul can motivate the agent all by itself. Yet none of this evidence is conclusive as to whether or not the motivation to act in some way or another from a given part of the soul will result in the act being performed by that same part of the soul. At the very least though Lorenz has provided evidence that each soul-part is “…capable of giving rise to fully formed impulses to act…” (Lorenz, 2006). This gives him a firm foundation to pursue the further claim that each soul-part is able to “…all by itself, get a person to behave in some specific way or other.” (Lorenz, 2006).

III

     Briefly, I would like to turn to a particular objection that if not responded to properly could be devastating to Lorenz’s interpretation. At Republic 553A 1-555B 2 some scholars claim that the conflict Plato describes is not only between two distinct soul-parts, but a conflict within appetite. If a successful defense of this is possible, it would violate Plato’s PO and would cause trouble for Lorenz’s interpretation of Plato’s theory. It is because a desire to and aversion of the same thing at the same time cannot exist in the same part of the soul that allows Plato to argue it is a thing of parts. However, if appetite in the above passage can have conflicting desires at the same time in respect to the same thing one might wonder (1) why other parts of the soul cannot do so and (2) why the soul needs to be a thing of parts in the first place if appetite can house this conflict alone. The passage concerns the Oligarchic man, specifically “…both how he comes to be and what sort of man he is.”  Socrates says he is a man concerned solely with money, and is ruled by the appetitive part of his soul.  But he is a good man, he works hard, is honest, holds a favorable standing in his community and is though to be just.  However he will also act unjustly when it is possible for him to do so and get away from it , but in all other cases, he will be in control of himself and in control of his desires.
     It is because the appetitive part of the Oligarch’s soul both contributes favorably to his life, and at the same time has the ability to be damaging to it by motivating him to gain wealth in unjust ways, that leads some scholars to suggest that Plato’s PO is being violated in this case. The following passage lends support to their view:

"Then someone like that wouldn’t be entirely free from internal civil war and wouldn’t be on but in some way two, though generally his better desires are in control of his worse…For this reason, he’d be more respectable than many, but the true virtue of a single-minded and harmonious soul far escapes him.” (Republic, 554D 8-E 4)

Here Socrates seems to suggest that in the Oligarch’s appetitive part can, and in rarity will, exhibit a conflict in relation to the same thing, at the same time.  The Oligarch will both desire to accumulate wealth and at the same time be averse to doing so. As the appetitive part of the soul as we have said is concerned with not just food, drink, and sex but also money , it prima facie appears that Plato has violated the PO.  But this is mistaken.
     To use the word ‘επιθυμαι’ (appetite) in such a way that it only refers to the appetitive part of the soul overlooks important passages in the Republic. Throughout the Republic the word is used in a variety of different contexts, e.g. in a conversation with Cephalus he refers to his ‘desires (επιθυμιαι) for arguments (λογοι)’, and similarly with Thrasymachus Socrates said he experienced an intense desire (επιθυμειν) to earn people’s esteem. In both contexts we can see that the word is being used to mean ‘to desire’ or ‘to desire intensely’, and that the proper subjects of the desires themselves is not appetite. In the case of Cephalus his desire for arguments (or conversation) would come from reason, and in the case of Thrasymachus his desire for esteem from spirit. It is a mistake to think that the word ‘επιθυμαι’ refers solely to appetite itself or to think that only the appetitive part of the soul is capable of having desires. As each part of Plato’s soul is thought to be concerned with different things, like the citizens of the city, it is consistent to say that each will, and does, desire different things (money, wisdom, or knowledge).
     Having made these clarifications when we read Socrates as saying, “…though generally his better desires are in control of his worse.”  We can say the conflict in question is not between appetite itself, but between appetite and reason, appetite and spirit, or appetite and both reason and spirit as spirit is reasons “natural ally”.  Therefore, scholars who wish to interpret this passage as Plato alluding to conflicts within appetite itself will have the task of explaining why we should read the term ‘επιθυμαι’ in such a narrow context. Or, if they choose to allow ‘επιθυμαι’ to be interpreted as ‘to desire’, they will have to explain why spirit and reason are incapable of desires.

IV

     Now that we understand how, for Lorenz, Plato argues for tri-partition it will be helpful to understand what it means to say that appetite is “non-rational”. First and foremost Lorenz wishes to make it clear that by saying it is “non-rational” he argues that Plato denies the appetite to be capable of belief  and means-end reasoning. If appetite was capable of means-end reasoning, Lorenz would have to explain why this capability is a “non-rational” capability and what, then, makes reason “rational”. But why think that appetite is capable of means-end reasoning in the first place?
     While the evidence in favor of this view is inconclusive, Socrates says:

“Hence we call it the appetitive part, because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex and all the things associated with them, but we also call it the money-loving part, because such appetites are most easily satisfied by means of money.” (Republic, 580E 1-581A 1)

While Socrates does not say explicitly that appetite desires money on these grounds alone, i.e. to satisfy other desires, it does seem that if appetite does desire money, it desires it in part as a means to satisfy some other desires, e.g. food or drink. Such a desire seems to entail the possibility of appetite being capable of means-end reasoning. Yet Lorenz argues that appetites desire for money is non-instrumental. He believes this because Socrates argues for the censorship of certain stories that children are traditionally told in their upbringing, specifically ones that represent the Gods as being bribable.  The young child’s soul, Socrates believes, is “most malleable and take on any pattern one wishes to impress on them (377 B 1-2).” (Lorenz, 2006)
     Taking this into account Lorenz can argue against the claim that appetite desires money instrumentally and therefore is capable of means-end reasoning. Instead he offers the interpretation that appetite’s desire for money is, “…much like its other desires, based on, or consists in, some kind of appreciation of, or attachment to, something or other (in this case, money) as a direct source of pleasure.” (Lorenz, 2006) And indeed Socrates endorses this position when he discusses the Oligarchic man (brackets my edit):

“Won’t the money-maker [read: oligarchic man] say that the pleasure of being honored and that of learning are worthless compared to that [read: the pleasure] of making a profit, if he gets no money from them?” (Republic 581C 11-D 3)

If one wishes to claim that appetite is capable of means-end reasoning, or that this is why the appetitive part of the soul is attracted to money in the first place, they will need to deal with the relevant passages cited here and explain why we ought to interpret them otherwise. Until then, I agree with Lorenz that part of appetite’s “non-rational” state consists in it being incapable of means-end reasoning.
     So if appetite is denied the resource of means-end reasoning, what other capacities does Plato attribute to it in order for it to motivate and ultimately get an agent to act in some way or another? Whatever these resources may be it is safe to assume that appetite does not wander aimlessly without any direction to its desires. In previous examples, such as the case of Leontius, it is clear that appetite is capable of directing itself as some specific thing.
     Lorenz attempts to reconcile this problem by looking to the Timaeus and the Philebus in hopes of illuminating on how appetite, absent the ability for means-end reasoning, is capable of getting an agent to act in some way or another all by itself. He admits that the passages themselves are not particularly helpful, but do offer useful information that could provide the basis for an interpretation of non-rational cognition in Plato. Lorenz cites and interprets three passages but for my present purposes I will only focus on what he calls ‘Passage 2’, Philebus 32B 9-36C 2.  
     This passage introduces the idea of the “pleasures of anticipation”. (Lorenz, 2006) What Socrates is attempting to account for is the dispositions of an agent prior to experiencing the pleasure or pain from a given experience:

“…the anticipation by the soul itself of these two kinds of experiences; the expectation before the actual pleasure will be pleasant and will inspire confidence, while the expectation of pain will be frightening and painful.” (Philebus 32B 9-C 2)

And in order to account for this he must clarify how the non-rational parts of the soul are able to experience these pleasures of anticipation, as they are restricted to only being able to perceive their current environment. In order for these distinctive types of pleasure to occur in the non-rational parts of the soul it must have access to some capacity that allows for foresight. Socrates thinks they do: memory. Desires such as thirst not only reflect the current state of the agent, the depleted state, but also reflect its opposite, the replenished state. Because “…perception could not serve to provide the required ‘contact’ with replenishment, given that the organism’s current situation is one of depletion.” (Lorenz, 2006) Socrates concludes that “…the soul makes contact with the replenishment, and it clearly must do so through memory.”  
     Further, Socrates according to Lorenz suggests that memory goes further than merely providing the necessary cognitive contact to the future state desired, it can also guide the agent’s actions and behavior in pursuit of satisfying this desire. In support of this claim Lorenz writes, “If memory can supply awareness of what it is the subject wants, it is reasonable to suppose that it can also supply awareness of how to obtain the object of desire, provided the possession and preservation of suitable sensory impressions.” (Lorenz, 2006) So in discussing this unique type of pleasure that all soul parts can experience Lorenz, while denying belief and means-end reasoning to the lower parts of the soul, specifically appetite, has offered a vague, yet plausible account of how appetite can not only motivate an agent to act in some way or another, but also cause the agent to act in some way or another all by itself. The use of memory in conjunction with a desire for something contributes not only to fully forming the desire itself, but also clarifies how it is that appetite is able to guide the agent, all by itself, in pursuit of satisfying this desire.

V

     Until now I have been explicating the central points of Lorenz’s interpretation of Plato’s psychology, but despite his efforts he does not successfully establish the interpretation regarding appetite, specifically that “…it can, all by itself, get a person to behave in some specific way or other.” (Lorenz, 2006) In the process of attempting to establish this claim however, Lorenz has, I think, shed a great deal of light on Plato’s psychological picture and has contributed immensely to the way we will interpret and read Plato in the future. I see two issues that prevent the above claim from being established.
     The first issue concerns the text directly and the way Lorenz reinterprets his thesis. That is to say, throughout the text several different constructions appear attempting to reiterate his claim regarding appetite and action. These constructions are listed below:

(1) “…the theory takes appetite, like other parts of the soul, to be capable of giving rise to fully formed impulses to act, so that it can, all by itself, get a person to behave in some specific way or another.” (Lorenz, 2006)

(2) “…the soul’s lower parts, in spite of their limited cognitive abilities, can nonetheless generate fully formed motivating conditions and, by doing so, originate actions all on their own.” (Lorenz, 2006)

(3) “…how cognitive resources below belief and reason can, on Plato’s view, account for the formation of determinate desire and, by doing so, for the origination of action.” (Lorenz, 2006)

(4) “…the theory takes appetite to be capable, all by itself, of giving rise to fully formed motivation conditions, and hence to episodes of behavior, and even to episodes of human behavior.” (Lorenz, 2006)    

Each of these constructions is consistent, at least enough, concerning the formation of motivating conditions. But each of these constructions differs significantly in how they express the latter claim that Lorenz is attempting to establish. It is because of such variance that it makes it difficult to understand what Lorenz’s goal is and whether or not he has established it. For example, (1) expresses the success of performing the given action appetite desires to all on its own, while (2) retracts itself to merely establishing that appetite can originate actions all on its own, but it does not imply that appetite can carry them out all by itself. (3) Continues the thread of origination, while (4) reads saying appetite can give rise to episodes of behavior, presumably all by itself, but not all by itself carry them out. In a way one could argue that (2), (3), and (4) are essentially driving at the same thing, but (1) is still goes further than any of these. And since (1) is the original interpretation of the thesis that appears at the beginning of the work I take that to be the actual goal.
     That being said, Lorenz has established the former claim in each of these constructions concerning motivating conditions. In fact, if this claim could not be established I have doubts that argument for tri-partition could even get off the ground. The latter claim, depending on which construction we choose to read that the proper one still remains unclear. But even if we take (1) to be the original thesis, I am still reluctant to grant Lorenz’s success in establishing it.
     Lorenz attempts to account for appetite getting an agent to act all by itself through the use of memory, as it is reasonable to think that memory can guide the agent’s actions. Yet he points out that because Socrates accepts memory as being necessary for this to occur, “Socrates seems to be fully prepared to accept a consequences of his account, namely that newborn babies could not form desires like hunger or thirst, in so far as they do not yet possess the impressions that we enable them to make cognitive contact with the relevant kinds of replenishment.” (Lorenz, 2006) This passage brings worries that I will discuss in a moment. But further Lorenz seems to think that because reason is not fully developed until a certain age that, “…for a considerable period in their development, the behavior of children will depend on the functioning of their soul’s non-rational parts.” (Lorenz, 2006) Because Timaeus thinks that “…whenever a soul is bound within a moral body, it at first lacks understanding.” (Timaeus 44A 7-8) And both of these passages lend support to his interpretation of appetite.
     If appetite can get an agent to act in some way or another all by itself through the utilization of memory, and indeed it seems it has to given that the rational part of the soul is underdeveloped at birth, we still lack an adequate explanation as to how these memories are formed, retained, and ultimately accessed by appetite and presumably spirit. It is also unclear as to whether or not reason during these early stages of development is underdeveloped, i.e. lacking its full potential, or completely dormant, i.e. completely excluded from the “carrying-out” of actions. If reason is underdeveloped it could still play a role in the process of “action”, it may be responsible entirely for this, and it being underdeveloped merely alludes to the fact it has difficulty warding off the desires of appetite. If reason is completely dormant one must struggle with the consequences that follow from that, namely a) how does reason develop to its full and proper state and b) how does appetite carry out actions without memories or means-end reasoning. Thus without adequate clarification of these two issues, Lorenz is prevented from successfully establishing his interpretation of appetite in Plato’s psychology.
      In this paper I have laid out the central points that aim to establish Lorenz’s interpretation of Plato’s appetitive part of the soul. I think much of what he has written is valuable and as a result his interpretation stands as being one we ought to seriously consider accepting. At the same time, despite his admirable effort, he has failed to successfully bring closure to his interpretation. Even if we are charitable and overlook the variances in how he presents his thesis there are still further worries that prevent his interpretation from being accepted. In order to firmly establish his view, he still needs to offer a more comprehensive account of memory and its influence, relation, and use by appetite. Further, he must also offer some account of reason’s state during early child development. Yet even though Lorenz must combat these issues he has nonetheless provided us with a rich account of Plato’s psychology that will be undoubtedly helpful in interpreting Plato in the future.